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Two substantial traditions of negotiation scholarship provide different perspectives on
the factors that generate outcomes. One of these traditions is found in the work of con-
flict resolution (CR) theorists. They place their bets on the role played by the negotia-
tion process. Another is found in the work of many international relations (IR)
researchers. They prefer studying the role played by the larger contexts surrounding
negotiation. This clash of perspectives is due, at least in part, to a prevailing focus on
either micro (CR) or macro (IR) level variables. We confront these perspectives in this
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Abstract
This study evaluates a set of hypotheses about the relative
influence of negotiating processes and contexts on out-
comes. The investigation proceeds in a sequence of steps.
First, a number of process and outcome variables are
coded from documented cases of 26 settled violent con-
flicts that have occurred since the end of World War II.
These cases are used also to evaluate the impact of four
contextual variables. High partial correlations indicate a
strong relationship between process and outcome control-
ling for context. Second, a set of structured focused
comparisons was conducted with four matched and mis-
matched cases. By tracing the process in each of these
cases through phases of the talks, we showed that there is
a causal relationship between process and outcome.
Third, a plausibility probe was designed to identify a
mechanism responsible for the causal relationship. The
probe discovered that the development of trust is a plau-
sible explanation for the relationship between process and
outcome. This mode of inquiry, referred to as ACE
(association, causation, and explanation), is regarded as a
model for research on negotiation and peace processes.
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article by pitting them against each other as competing hypotheses. The central question
of the research is whether process or context has a stronger impact on the outcomes of
negotiations intended to end violence.
We provide background on the competing arguments along with hypotheses. Three
sets of hypotheses are presented in an attempt to capture the issue; they emphasize
either process or context. The hypotheses are evaluated in sequence, with both a large
and small number of cases, proceeding from statistical analyses that demonstrate asso-
ciation (A) to qualitative investigations that ascertain causation (C) to plausibility
probes that identify explanatory mechanisms (E). The ACE methodology is a contribu-
tion to the analysis of comparative case studies. By employing the logic of experimenta-
tion, we go beyond the discovery of statistical relationships. The methodology allows us
to probe both for causation and explanation. This is an innovation for case-based
research, which has been primarily descriptive or correlational.
Conflict Resolution: Process
A fundamental question asked by many CR researchers is: to what extent are outcomes
the result of negotiating processes? A number of the early conceptual frameworks posit
that outcomes derive directly from negotiating processes (Sawyer & Guetzkow, 1965
Randolph, 1966; Druckman, 1973). Walton and McKersie (1965) introduced the distinc-
tion between two types of processes, distributive and integrative bargaining. Better, more
lasting outcomes were thought to derive from integrative than from distributive
processes. Support for this hypothesis has come from a variety of laboratory studies (see
Pruitt, 1981, and Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993, for reviews), computer simulations (Bartos,
1995), and field studies (Kressel, Fontera, Forlenza, Butler, & Fish, 1994). These studies
have identified the factors that increase the chances of discovering an integrative solution:
They include logrolling skills, attractiveness of alternatives, information exchange
processes, low time pressure, and privacy (see Druckman & Robinson, 1998, for a review
of the factors). Emphasized in particular is the importance of problem solving—as
contrasted to bargaining—processes. An attempt is made in this study to investigate the
role of problem solving in negotiations intended to achieve peace agreements between
countries in conflict or at war.
Many of the earlier frameworks suggest that problem-solving processes increase the
chances of obtaining more comprehensive outcomes. This usually means that more
issues are resolved, more attention is paid to ongoing relationships, and attempts are
made to address the sources of the conflict. In contrast, less comprehensive (more
partial) outcomes consist of fewer issues settled and less attention paid to long-term
matters such as relationships and sources of conflict. A similar distinction is made
between resolutions and settlements. The former deal with the parties’ needs and values
as well as interests; the latter is limited to an efficient agreement that may primarily
handle the distributive issues (see Druckman, 2002, for more on this distinction). A key
element in problem solving is the willingness by negotiating parties to explore together
a variety of possible options that can be evaluated in terms of satisfying their underlying
interests and needs. This element is often missing when parties engage in an exchange
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of concessions that occur in bargaining. At the heart of this argument is the assumption
that different kinds of negotiation processes produce different outcomes. This assump-
tion takes the form of a hypothesis to be explored in this study.
With regard to international negotiation, Hopmann (1995) connects the distinction
between bargaining and problem solving to the prevailing perspectives on IR. The
customary competitive bargaining engaged in by diplomats reflects a realist approach to
foreign policy. The emphasis is placed on achieving relative gains—correlated to relative
power—both inside and outside of negotiating venues. This approach has produced
inflexibility on the part of negotiators and impasses as the outcome of many inter-
governmental talks. The less-often used problem-solving approach corresponds to a
liberal approach to foreign policy. The emphasis is placed on attaining absolute gains
that refer to joint (rather than relative) benefits. This approach should produce negotia-
tor flexibility and more satisfactory negotiation outcomes. Indeed, evidence for these
relationships was obtained by Wagner (2008). Her content analyses of 13 historical cases
of bilateral and multilateral negotiations showed that problem-solving behaviors corre-
lated significantly with the extent to which outcomes were integrative or comprehensive.
Processes that are more likely to lead to integrative agreements included frequent prob-
lem-solving behaviors, a sustained use of these behaviors through the middle phases of
negotiation, a framing of the issues in terms of shared values, and the creation of formu-
lae. These processes were found to occur less often in negotiations over security issues.
Similar findings were obtained from the Druckman and Lyons (2005) comparative
study of peace processes. They found that frequent problem-solving behaviors with an
emphasis on joint gains led to more integrative outcomes than frequent distributive
behaviors with an emphasis on relative gains. The former were displayed by parties
negotiating the 1992 Rome agreement that resolved the conflict in Mozambique; the
latter were displayed by the parties negotiating the 1994 cease fire between Armenia and
Azerbaijan over Negorno-Karabakh. The authors note that problem-solving behaviors
are more likely to occur when parties enter talks with cooperative orientations. Liberal
approaches to foreign policy are more likely to encourage these orientations, which, in
turn, set into motion a process sequence that results in sustained political agreements.
Those agreements are closer to a resolution (as in Mozambique) than to a settlement
(as in Nagorno-Karabakh) of the conflict.
Our analysis examines the relationship between process and outcome. At the same time,
however, our approach accounts for the evidence upon which these conclusions (i.e.,
problem-solving or distributive bargaining process and more or less comprehensive out-
comes) are made. We accomplish this by organizing the component parts of process and
outcome identified in the earlier studies on negotiation into a series of continua, measur-
ing each case on eight separate aspects of process and five features of outcome. With
regard to process, we distinguish between competitive, mixed, and cooperative processes.
These approaches are defined in several ways: whether the negotiators emphasize relative
or absolute joint gains (Hopmann, 1995); whether they employ distributive or integrative
strategies (Walton & McKersie, 1965); whether they promote their own positions or focus
on their underlying interests (Fisher & Ury, 1981), and whether they primarily exchange
concessions or share information about their interests and needs (Kressel et al., 1994).
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These distinctions resemble the aggregated categories of hard versus soft bargaining
derived from the categories of the bargaining process analysis coding system (Walcott &
Hopmann, 1978). The other process variables include the difference between concealing
and sharing information (Groom, 1986; Kressel et al., 1994), threatening or advising/ques-
tioning (Fisher, 1997), ambiguous or clear language (Walton & McKersie, 1965; Kelman,
1965), and the distinction among types of conflict behaviors (competing, avoiding,
accommodating, cooperating, collaborating) (Fisher, 1997; Groom, 1986).
An attempt was also made to unpack the concept of negotiating outcomes, particu-
larly the distinction between comprehensive and partial or unresolved outcomes. The
earlier studies emphasize contrasting outcomes: those that consider implementation and
those that do not (Groom, 1986; Kressel et al., 1994; Druckman, Martin, Allen Nan, &
Yagcioglu, 1999); those that include joint projects versus those that only reflect the par-
ties’ claims (Fisher, 1997); and those that resolve underlying issues versus those that do
not (Fisher, 1997; Azar & Burton, 1986). In addition, outcomes of peace negotiations
address the extent to which demobilization of troops or demilitarization has occurred
(Lyons, 2002) and the extent to which constitutional reform was instituted (Groom,
1986; Hume, 1994).1
The review suggests that processes and outcomes are correlated. Many of the earlier
studies also suggest that processes cause outcomes. Thus, two general hypotheses are
offered:
Hypothesis 1a: Cooperative or problem-solving (competitive/distributive) negotiation
processes co-vary with more (less) comprehensive negotiating outcomes.
Hypothesis 1b: Cooperative or problem-solving (competitive/distributive) negotiation
processes lead to more (less) comprehensive negotiation outcomes.
These hypotheses do not, however, suggest reasons why the relationship between pro-
cesses and outcomes occur. Questions that arise are: what accounts for the relationship
between negotiating processes and outcomes and why do cooperative (competitive) pro-
cesses result in comprehensive (partial) outcomes? The experimental literature offers
some clues. Trust has been shown to be key to negotiation strategies and outcomes as
both an antecedent and consequence (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). High and low trusts
distinguish between integrative and distributive strategies (Rotter, 1971; Kramer, 1994;
Lewicki, Litterer, Minton, & Sanders, 1994). Trusting negotiators have been shown to
use more integrative or cooperative strategies than those who do not trust their oppo-
nents (see also Parks & Rumble, 2001). In these experiments, trust was assessed prior to
negotiation. This is difficult to do with historical case studies. The cases can however be
analyzed for the way trust develops during the course of a negotiation. Moving from
initial low levels to higher levels of trust should coincide with more cooperative pro-
cesses leading to better joint outcomes. This stage-like concept progresses from mistrust
1Other aspects of processes (e.g., tactics and issues) and outcomes (e.g., durability) may also be relevant.
Our focus on extent of problem-solving processes and comprehensive outcomes derives from the earlier lit-
erature reviewed above.
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to calculus-based, knowledge-based, and identity-based trust (Lewicki & Stevenson,
1997). An attempt is made in this study to assess the progression of trust in several
cases. The relationship posited is that the development of trust and cooperative (prob-
lem-solving) behavior are mutually reinforcing processes that lead to more comprehen-
sive outcomes. Two hypotheses are suggested:
Hypothesis 2a: Cooperative (competitive) negotiation processes co-vary with increased
(decreased) trust between the parties.
Hypothesis 2b: Increased (decreased) levels of trust—going from calculus (identity)
to identity (calculus)-based trust—lead to more (less) comprehensive negotiating
outcomes.
International Relations: Context
An emphasis on context rather than process is found in the work of many IR researchers.
Results obtained in several negotiation studies suggest that context may be important. In
a study of base-rights negotiations, Druckman (1986) showed that the final agreement
was primarily the result of an external event, in that case the death of a head of state.
Similar findings were obtained from an analysis of 23 cases of bilateral and multilateral
international negotiations. Outcomes did not derive from processes. They were influenced
more by outside influences, political relations, and features of the negotiating situation
(Druckman, 1997). Those analyses also found that the set of cases could be distinguished
in terms of conference size and issue complexity. One difference is that treaties were the
more likely outcome of bilateral than multilateral talks. These studies call attention to the
importance of factors outside of the process, in the negotiating situation. The factors are
aspects of the proximal situation confronting negotiators.
While calling attention to the importance of these factors, the studies do not probe
the broader contexts in which the negotiations occurred. That context includes the more
distal features of regional and international structures including geography. Those are
the types of factors emphasized more generally by macro-level perspectives on negotia-
tion in IR (e.g., Simmons, 2002; Werner, 1999).
Information about these more distal features of the negotiating context can be found in
the democratic peace, militarized interstate conflict, and alliance literatures. The previous
research on these topics shows that four variables are particularly relevant to relationships
among negotiating parties before, during, and after conflict. They are regime type,
geographic proximity, alliances, and regional stability. Similar regimes, particularly if they
are democracies, have been shown to avoid going to war against each other, preferring
instead to resolve their differences through negotiation (Maoz & Russett, 1993). Conflicts
between neighboring states have been found to be more intense than those between distant
states, due in part to the need to protect their borders or the desire to expand those
borders (Magstadt, 1994; Harbour, 2003). Members of the same international alliance are
more likely than nonallied states to resolve disputes between them peacefully, particularly
if the states are members of small alliances (Oren, 1990). Mousseau (1998) has argued
that alliance bureaucratic structures provide mechanisms for internal dispute resolution.
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Regional stability has also been shown to contribute to peaceful relations among states.
Referred to as ‘‘spillover effects,’’ conflict in one country can destabilize another country
in the same region (Singer & Wildavsky, 1996). The settlements of violent conflicts are
more difficult to negotiate in less stable regions. These variables are aspects of the broad
context thought to account for negotiating outcomes. The discussion above suggests a
third set of hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3a: More (less) comprehensive outcomes result from negotiations between
similar (different) regimes, particularly if the similar regimes are democracies.
Hypothesis 3b: More (less) comprehensive outcomes result from negotiations between
distant (neighboring) states.
Hypothesis 3c: More (less) comprehensive outcomes result from negotiations between
members of the same (different) relatively small international alliance.
Hypothesis 3d: More (less) comprehensive outcomes result from negotiations between
members of stable (unstable) regions.
The three sets of hypotheses confront competing explanations for negotiation out-
comes. Are outcomes accounted for primarily by negotiating processes or more by the
context within which negotiation occurs? Conceivably, both process and context may
influence outcomes, as noted by Druckman (1983, 2007). The issue addressed by this
study concerns the relative strength of these types of factors. This issue addresses
independent influences. But, more complex interactions between process and context
may also occur, as when trust develops more easily between parties who are members of
the same alliance or have similar regimes. Thus, contextual factors may have indirect
influences on outcomes through processes. Processes may intervene between contextual
factors and outcomes. We return to this issue in the discussion section.
This study is significant in several ways. It contributes a systematic approach for
comparative research with cases. The hypotheses are evaluated by a sequence of analyses
referred to as association, causation, and explanation (ACE). It provides insights into an
important theoretical issue that divides those conflict researchers who focus their atten-
tion on process and the IR scholars who study context. Going beyond statistical rela-
tionships, the analyses suggest a possible mechanism for the findings. Further, the
diverse set of cases analyzed strengthens the argument for external validity. In the
sections to follow, we discuss the logic of this sequence, the methods used for analysis,
the results, implications for the issues that are addressed, and ideas for further research.
The Approach
The multi-method approach taken in this study is shown in Table 1. A large-N statistical
analysis precedes the small-n focused comparisons and process tracing. These analyses
are sequential. Each question asked follows from the results obtained from the analyses
performed on the prior question. For example, a nonspurious relationship obtained
between processes and outcomes leads to an investigation of causality. Hypothesized
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results are also shown in the table. The first question addresses hypothesis 1a: What is the
relationship between negotiating processes and outcomes? This hypothesis is addressed
with 26 cases of negotiations to end violent international conflicts.2 Spearman rank-order
correlations were computed among the various process and outcome variables as well as
between an aggregated process and outcome index.
The second question addresses hypotheses 3a–d. It asks whether the obtained co-vari-
ance between process and outcome is genuine or a reflection of several aspects of the larger
context surrounding the negotiations. Partial rank-order correlations were computed to
ascertain the relationship between process and outcome controlling for the influences of
the four context variables. As well, the relationship between context and outcome was
assessed controlling for the influence of the process variables.
Next, we address hypothesis 1b by probing the direction of the relationship between
processes and outcomes. This probe consists of a structured focused-comparison that
matches cases for similarities and differences. The logic was developed originally by John
Stuart Mill and is referred to as the method of difference and the method of agreement
(see Faure, 1994). His ‘‘method of difference’’ consists of examining the most similar
cases for differences on the independent and dependent variables. His ‘‘method of agree-
ment’’ consists of examining the least similar cases for similarities on the independent
and dependent variables. These experimental-like comparisons bolster an interpretation
that the independent variables caused the dependent variable because other variables
were ‘‘held constant’’ (most similar cases) or differed in ways that only the similar
independent variable under study—namely, the negotiation process—would have been
responsible for the values on the dependent variable (least similar cases).
The conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh and between
Georgia and South Ossetia were selected for the most similar comparisons. These cases
Table 1
Methods, Hypothesized Relationships, and Cases
Method of analysis Process variable Outcome variable Case(s)
Large-N studies
Correlation/partial correlation Problem solving More comprehensive Sampling of 26 cases
Distributive bargaining Less comprehensive
Small-n studies
Most similar (Mills’ method
of difference)
Problem solving More comprehensive Georgia/South Ossetia
Distributive bargaining Less comprehensive Nagorno-Karabakh
Most different (Mills’ method
of agreement)
Problem solving More comprehensive Ecuador/Peru
Problem solving More comprehensive Mozambique
Plausibility probe – trust
develops
Problem solving More comprehensive Ecuador/Peru
Mozambique
Georgia/South Ossetia
Plausibility probe – trust
diminishes
Distributive bargaining Less comprehensive Nagorno-Karabakh
2Twenty-two of the 26 cases used in the analysis were inter-state conflicts.
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were similar in terms of geographic location, population size, variety and distribution of
ethnic groups, religion, literacy rate, type of government, and labor force demographics.
They differed however on the process variables. The question asked is whether they
differed also on the dependent outcome variables. The conflicts within Mozambique and
between Ecuador and Peru were selected for the least similar comparisons. These cases
differed on the nonprocess variables but were similar on the process variables. The ques-
tion asked is whether similar outcomes occurred. For both analyses, we asked—following
hypothesis 1b—whether problem-solving (distributive) processes lead to comprehensive
(partial or impasse) outcomes (see Table 1). These four cases were not included in the
larger set used for the statistical analyses.
Further evidence that bears on causality was provided by the results of a process-tracing
analysis of the four cases used in the focused comparison. Referred to by George and
Bennett (2005) as process verification, we asked whether the observed relationships
between process and outcome correspond to theoretical predictions. Affirmative evidence
is provided by an unbroken chain of events from processes to outcomes. This is indicated
by a continuously high or increasing level of problem-solving behaviors exhibited during
the process culminating in comprehensive outcomes. It is also indicated by a continuing
low or decreasing level of problem-solving behaviors exhibited during the process
culminating in less comprehensive outcomes.3
The fourth question addresses hypotheses 2a and 2b on the mechanism that explains the
process-outcome relationship. This question was addressed by performing a plausibility
probe on each of the four cases selected for the focused comparisons. Referred to by
George and Bennett (2005) as process induction, we asked whether the relationship
between process and outcome is mediated by trust. This is indicated by movement during
the process from lower (mistrust or calculus-based trust) to higher levels (knowledge or
identity-based trust) of trust for the problem-solving cases, as suggested by hypothesis 2b.
It is also indicated by decreasing levels of trust for cases with distributive processes, also
suggested by hypothesis 2b.4 Trust levels were monitored throughout the process following
Trochim’s pattern matching technique.5 The result is a chronological path that shows
variation as well as central tendencies. The paths for problem-solving and distributive cases
are compared. A chain of expected changes (variation) or of expected average levels
of trust would support the hypothesis that this variable moderates the process-outcome
relationship.
In the next section we describe the criteria used for case selection. This is followed by
a discussion of the way that the various process, outcome, and context variables were
measured.
3All the cases chosen for analysis resulted in settlements. Although the settlements varied in degree of com-
prehensiveness (the dependent variable), there were no stalemates. Thus, we did not consider cases where
problem-solving behaviors did not culminate in agreements.
4Continuous high (low) levels of trust for the problem-solving (distributive) cases also suggest that trust is a
plausible explanation for the process-outcome relationship.
5See Trochim’s web site at: http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/pmconval.htm.
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Cases
The criteria used to select cases for the large-N analyses were: (a) a settled violent inter-
national conflict, (b) a violent conflict between a governing regime and an insurgency
that was settled, or (c) the settlement process consisted primarily of negotiation. An
extensive search resulted in 55 cases of post-World War II negotiated settlements of
conflicts widely dispersed around the world from the 1940s to the 1990s. However,
many of these cases were not sufficiently documented to permit coding on many of our
variables. Using documentation as another criterion for selection, 26 cases were chosen
for analysis. Most cases were located through the Pew Case Studies on International
Affairs at Georgetown’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, the Harvard Law School
Program on Negotiation, books of case studies (e.g., Greenberg et al., 2000) and some
internet sources. The cases ranged between 20 and 75 pages in length.
Additional cases were selected for the qualitative analyses. Since these cases were to be
used for more detailed process tracing, book length documentation was desired. With
the assistance of knowledgeable scholars, we selected four cases not used in the large-N
analyses. As shown in Table 1, the two most similar cases were the conflicts in Georgia/
South Ossetia (Gluskin, 1997) and in Nagorno-Karabakh (Mooradian, 1996). The two
most different cases were the conflict between Ecuador and Peru (Marcella & Downes,
1999) and within Mozambique (Hume, 1994). These cases were used also for the plausi-
bility probes designed to identify a mechanism responsible for the relationship between
negotiating process and outcome.
Measuring Processes, Outcomes, and Context
The variables consisted of eight indicators of negotiating process, five outcome variables,
four context indicators, and a trust scale for the plausibility probe. Sources for each
variable were discussed above. The process and outcome variables were scaled in terms
of four steps, ranging from most competitive (least comprehensive) to most cooperative
(most comprehensive). The decision to use four steps was made in conjunction with
our reading of the case documentation. A key decision was the distinction between the
two mixed categories: It was possible to distinguish between a moderate amount of
competition (some agreements) and a moderate amount of cooperation (a larger
number of agreements). These steps seemed to capture the range of variation found in
the case documentation. An example of a process scale is as follows:
(1) Commitment to positions: A party has ‘‘dug in its heels’’ and become unwilling to change
a negotiating position, especially due to a belief in perceived power or superiority over
the other party.
(2) Mixed: A party is attempting to strengthen its position, wanting to stick with it, but
recognizing that it may not have capabilities to stand firm.
(3) Mixed: A party may be willing to abandon or alter its position, but only because it
feels it does not have the capacity to stand firm.
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(4) Identify interests: A party has begun to discard some of its inaccurate preconceptions
of the other and to develop an understanding of the parties’ interests underlying the
conflict.
The other process variables include the extent to which parties exchanged informa-
tion, a focus on maximizing own versus joint interests, relative or absolute (joint) gains,
threatening or empathizing with the other party, demanding or brainstorming, using
ambiguous or clear language, and being competitive or cooperative. Each of these
variables captured the distinction among being competitive (1), accommodative (2),
cooperative (3), or collaborative (4).
A negotiation was an incident within which codeable events occurred. Events con-
sisted of the actions or behaviors shown by parties (or representatives) as documented
during the course of negotiations. An event occurred during formal sessions as well as
during more informal meetings around the negotiation. An example of an event coded
in each of the categories of the continuum shown above follows.
(1) Commitment to
positions (2) Mixed (3) Mixed (4) Identify interests
However, the U.S.
did not attempt to
improve its
own BATNA, for two
reasons. First, American
policy makers generally
viewed military power
as roughly equivalent
to negotiating power –
neither side could
be expected to give
up at the conference
table what had not
been conceded on
the battlefield.
(Greenberg, 1992; 14)
The second meeting
consisted of two
phases: a private
meeting between the
heads of delegation
Guebuza and
Dommingos, and a
plenary session. The
result was a total
failure and the parties
decided to stop the
talks for a month
to reflect on their
different statements.
(Martinelli, 1999; 5)
The agreement and the oil
concessions themselves
needed the approval of
the Iranian Majlis; Majlis
elections were contingent
upon the withdrawal of
foreign forces from Iranian
territory. Hence, the Soviets
were tied to their
commitment to withdraw
in order to reap the
benefits of their agreement,
and they did accordingly
(Maloney, 1991; 7)
Fortunately, for the outcome
of the negotiations, the
players slowly discarded
inaccurate preconceptions
as personal relationships
developed. The
negotiations lasted for
over a year, long enough
to test
attributional/situational
assumptions (Oppenheimer,
1990; 14)
The five outcome variables consisted of a consideration of implementation issues, extent
to which joint projects were considered, the extent to which underlying issues were
addressed, the extent of demilitarization, and the extent to which constitutional reforms
were undertaken. An aggregated outcome variable combines these criteria, resulting in vary-
ing degrees of comprehensive outcomes. The implementation variable scale is as follows:
(1) Outcomes do not consider implementation: The agreement does not mention or
discuss difficulties with or options for addressing implementation issues that may
arise. For example, ‘‘The deal failed to hold because the most fundamental prerequi-
site for agreement—values on both sides must be changed—was never achieved’’
(Maloney, 1991, 33).
Negotiation Outcomes: Process or Context? Irmer and Druckman
218 Volume 2, Number 3, Pages 209–235
(2) Mixed: Parties acknowledge possible difficulties implementing the agreement but
do not mention them in the agreement.
(3) Mixed: Parties may have considered difficulties with or options for implementing
the agreement but have not addressed this in the agreement.
(4) Outcomes consider implementation: Parties have identified potential difficulties with
implementing the agreement and made some provision for or statement about address-
ing such difficulties in the agreement. For example, ‘‘Even with a substantive compro-
mise in place, there was still a perceived need to develop independent institutions in
order to guide the transition process. One useful precedent in the South African context
was the Commission of Inquiry into Public Violence’’ (Bouckaert, 2000; 254).
The four context variables were regime type, geographic proximity, alliances, and
regional stability. Categories for regime type were derived from Mousseau’s (1998)
modification of the Polity IV data set. Each negotiating case was categorized as ‘‘all parties
have autocratic regimes,’’ ‘‘mixed’’ (autocratic parties negotiating with democratic parties),
and ‘‘all parties are democratic.’’ The 1994 National Geographic World Political Map6 was
used to define the geographic proximity variable. Each case was judged as ‘‘the parties were
within the boundaries of the same sovereign state’’ (an example of intra-state conflict), ‘‘at
least two parties shared a common border’’ (contiguous states), and ‘‘none of the parties
shared a common border’’ (noncontiguous states). Oren’s (1990) data set was used to define
alliances: the parties in each case were judged as ‘‘not aligned,’’ ‘‘members of the same mul-
tilateral alliance,’’ or ‘‘members of the same small alliance.’’ Singer and Wildavsky’s (1996)
distinction between zones of turmoil and zones of peace was used to define the regional sta-
bility variable. Each case was categorized in terms of the locus of conflict: ‘‘within a zone of
turmoil’’ (instability), ‘‘neither type of zone’’ (somewhat stable), or ‘‘within a zone of peace’’
(stability). These distinctions apply both to the Cold War and post-Cold War periods.
Definitions of each category of the regime type variable with examples are the following:
(1) Autocracy: At the time of the conflict, no party had a democratic form of govern-
ment. An example is the Beagle Channel conflict between Argentina and Chile.
(2) Mixed: At the time of the conflict, fewer than all parties had democratic forms of
government. An example is the 1972 Simla Agreement between India and Pakistan.
(3) Democracy: At the time of the conflict, all parties to the conflict had a democratic
form of government. An example is the 1993 negotiation about the islands dispute
between Japan and Russia.
The development of trust among the parties is hypothesized as an intervening variable
that explains process–outcome relationships. Several stages of trust development have
been proposed including calculus, knowledge, and identity-based trust. These categories
can be arranged on a scale that preserves an ordering from less to more trusting
relationships: Calculus-based trust is a more conditional form than identity-based trust.
The order is as follows:
(1) No trust: The text indicates that parties did not trust each other. For example, ‘‘When
the Chairman refused their advice, the Karabakh leadership perceived that he was
making a political statement in support of Azerbaijan’’ (Mooradian, 1996; 398).
6This map can be found on the following web page: http://www.maps.com/map.aspx?pid=15622.
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(2) Calculus-based trust: The text indicates that parties perceived the others as being
consistent in their behavior, acting as though they believed the other would do
what it said it would, or witnessed that the other kept its promises. For example,
‘‘One participant attributed this to the fact that the South Ossetian issue was very
low priority in high Georgian political circles at the time’’ (Gluskin, 1997; 35)
(3) Knowledge-based trust: The text indicates that there was increased interaction
among the parties, increased information sharing among parties, or that parties
could accurately predict the other’s behavior. For example: ‘‘At the next round of
negotiations, the parties agreed that they would begin discussing the impasses, that
neither would veto the proposals of the other, and that all problems would be
discussed in summarized accounts. This meant that Peru and Ecuador would at
least listen to each others’ positions’’ (Marcella & Downes, 1999; 77–78).
(4) Identity-based trust: The text indicates that the parties began recognizing they had
shared interests and similar motivations, goals, and objectives, that they had shared
reactions in a common situation, or that they stood for the same values and prin-
ciples. For example, ‘‘Just before the start of the second brainstorming session in
Norway, the sides took an important step towards a resolution of the conflict... the
parties signed a Memorandum outlining confidence building measures to be
enacted to ensure security in the region’’ (Gluskin, 1997; 36).
These categories were used to code each of the events. Sequential events were organized
by time of occurrence, enabling us to perform a time series analysis.
Steps were taken during the coding process to avoid possible biases. First, the set of
cases was placed in two random orders. Second, the process coding, on the eight
variables, was performed on the first random order. Third, the outcome coding, on the
five variables, was done on the second random order. And finally, process and outcome
scores were aggregated for each case in preparation for the statistical analyses.
Reliabilities
Two additional coders, working independently, were given randomly selected case studies
and asked to: (a) identify codeable process events, (b) place each on the most relevant pro-
cess scale, and (c) assign the event a score of 1–4 on the continuum selected. Two analyses
of these data were performed. One compared the decisions made by each coder with those
made by the first author. With regard to identification of codeable events, average agree-
ment for one rater was 88%, for the other rater, 85%. With regard to selection of the spe-
cific scaled continuum for each event, one rater agreed on 73% of the events while the
other showed agreement on only 50% of the events. For placement on the scale selected,
agreements of 88% and 100% were obtained. Only one of these agreement percentages is
problematic. A possible explanation is that, unlike the first rater, the second was not in the
field of conflict analysis. The discrepancy (73% vs. 50%) may have reflected a difference
between them in content-relevant knowledge. However, when asked to assign a level to
the event on the selected continuum, these raters agreed all of the time.
A second analysis compared the coding results obtained by the first author with the
results obtained by the first coder using Cohen’s Kappa statistic and the averaging
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method (see Robson, 2002; see also Vanbelle and Albert, 2009, on the averaging method).
It should be noted that this statistic is sensitive to any deviation from complete agree-
ment. Thus, the estimates are conservative. With regard to scale choice, the unweighted
kappa coefficient is 0.71 (SE = .04). The frequencies and proportions of agreement are
shown in Table 2. The observed agreements deviate substantially from those expected by
chance with only one exception. Coders disagreed on scale G (ambiguous or clear lan-
guage): three of the six disagreements were between the G and H (type of conflict) scales.
With regard to choices on the scales, the unweighted kappa coefficient is also 0.71
(SE = .07). The 40 of 47 possible agreements on the problem-solving choices deviates
substantially from the 22 agreements expected by chance. The proportion of agreement is
0.73 (maximum possible is 0.97) which also deviates substantially from the proportion
expected by chance, which is 0.30. Similarly, the 47 agreements on distributive categories
deviate substantially from the 29 expected by chance. The proportion of agreement is
0.76 (maximum possible is 0.98), which also deviates substantially from the chance pro-
portion of 0.37. From these results, we conclude that the process scales are reliable.
The first author’s outcome judgments were then compared with those generated by
another independent coder. With regard to outcomes, the unweighted kappa coefficient
is 0.66 (maximum possible is 0.77). The observed agreements between these two
independent coders on each of the five outcome scales deviated substantially from
chance: 0.47 (observed; maximum possible is 0.67) versus 0.13 (chance expected); 0.55
(maximum possible is 0.67) versus 0.13; 0.53 (maximum possible is 0.93) versus 0.16;
0.78 (maximum possible is 1) versus 0.08, and 0.08 (maximum possible is 0.8) versus
0.04, respectively. These results indicate that the outcome scales are reliable.7
Table 2
Frequencies and Proportions of Agreement on the Process Variables
Variable*
Frequency Proportion
Chance Observed Chance Observed
A 9 32 .14 .76
B 2 14 .06 .78
C 2 13 .07 .50
D 1 7 .04 .35
E 5 22 .10 .69
F 1 10 .04 .63
G .03 0 .01 0
H 4 18 .16 .75
Note. *Process scales: A, maintain positions/discuss interests; B, conceal information/free exchange of infor-
mation; C, maximize individual interests/jointly explore common problems; D, seek relative gains/seek abso-
lute gains; E, violence, threatening/questioning, reassuring; F, concession-making, retracting/brainstorming;
G, ambiguous language/clear language; H, competitive/accommodative/co-operative/collaborative.
7Blind coding of outcomes—as was done here—may in fact underestimate agreement. It is likely that proper
understanding of the cases and their context would produce near-complete agreement on outcomes for practi-
cally all of the cases. Further, it should be noted that the quadratic weighted kappa was an impressive 0.76.
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Reliability statistics for the trust scale were calculated on comparable negotiation data
reported in three recent studies. In one study, we assessed trust on the statements made by
leaders surrounding the talks at Oslo I (Donohue & Druckman, 2009). Independent
judgments made by two coders were aggregated across the types of trust. The kappa
coefficient was 0.82. In another study, we assessed reliability for each scale based on reports
from negotiators in a simulated international negotiation (Druckman, Olekalns, & Smith,
2009). The Cronbach alphas were 0.49 (calculus-based trust), 0.62 (knowledge-based
trust), and 0.79 (identity-based trust). In a third study, we assessed reliability for each scale
based on reports from negotiators in a simulated business negotiation (Druckman et al.,
2009). The alphas were 0.45 (calculus-based trust), 0.64 (knowledge-based trust), and 0.72
(identity-based trust). These results indicate that the trust ratings are generally reliable.
Less agreement on calculus-based trust suggests that this is a more challenging category to
code.
Results
The results are presented in four parts following the order described above in the
section ‘‘The Approach.’’ First, the findings obtained from the statistical analyses of 26
cases are shown. These include both the process-outcome and context variable correla-
tions. Second, the focused-comparison findings are described for both the most and
least similar comparisons. Third, the process-tracing results are presented for each of
the four cases used in the focused-comparisons. A final section displays the time-series
tracings, referred to as plausibility probes, for each case.
Statistical Findings
Average scores on each process and outcome variable were calculated for each case. These
averages were then aggregated across the eight process and five outcome variables for
summary indices. The aggregated scores are shown in the Appendix by case. Overall, the
mean process score across the cases is 2.15, with a range from 1.09 to 3.21. On average,
negotiators in these cases used a distributive more than a problem-solving approach. The
mean outcome score is 2.06, with a range from 1.33 to 3.30. Thus, many of the cases
concluded with less comprehensive or more partial outcomes.
Correlations between the process and outcome variables are shown in Tables 3 and 4.
The Spearman correlation between the aggregated process and outcome indices is 0.81
(p < .001).8 This correlation indicates that type of negotiation process is strongly related
to type of outcome, with 64% of the variation in one variable explained by the other. The
more distributive the process, the less comprehensive the outcome. Further, the correla-
tions between each of the process variables and aggregated outcome is substantial, ranging
from a low of 0.39 (ambiguous vs. clear language) to 0.79 (concession-making/retracting
8The correlation increases to 0.86 when the four cases used in the small-n analyses are added to the data
set. To avoid a selection bias that could influence the small-n results, the correlation with the additional
cases was computed (N = 30) only after those analyses were completed.
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vs. brainstorming). Similarly, the outcome variables are highly correlated with aggregated
process with correlations ranging from 0.46 (consideration of implementation) to 0.76
(individual vs. joint claims). These results support hypothesis 1a.
The process-outcome correlations do not take context into account. Correlations
between each of the context variables and the aggregated process variable is generally
low: ).37 (regime type), ).45 (geographic proximity), .06 (alliances), and .03 (regional
stability) (see Table 5). Similarly, correlations with the aggregated outcome variable are
quite modest )0.22, )0.51, 0.05, and 0.23, respectively. Only the geographic proximity
variable is significant. Closer parties, such as those engaged in civil wars, are more likely
to engage in distributive bargaining resulting in less comprehensive outcomes. But, these
Table 3
Correlations Among Process Variables*
AGPRO A B C D E F G H
AGOUT .81 .67 .78 .65 .75 .49 .79 .39 .66
AGPRO .92 .72 .88 .86 .83 .90 .44 .87
A .56 .85 .78 .84 .78 .30 .79
B .55 .65 .52 .68 .36 .60
C .80 .74 .86 .39 .82
D .64 .85 .31 .74
E .69 .30 .71
F .39 .80
G .59
Note. *AGOUT, aggregate outcome; AGPRO, aggregate process; A, maintain positions/discuss interests; B,
conceal information/free exchange of information; C, maximize individual interests/jointly explore common
problems; D, seek relative gains/seek absolute gains; E, violence, threatening/questioning, reassuring; F,
concession-making, retracting/brainstorming; G, ambiguous language/clear language; H, competitive/
accommodative/co-operative/collaborative.
Table 4
Correlations Among Outcome Variables*
AGPRO I J K L M
AGOUT .81 .75 .81 .63 .47 .82
AGPRO .46 .76 .58 .60 .64
I .52 .29 .30 .52
J .49 .38 .60
K .10 .60
L .45
Note. *I, outcome does/does not consider implementation; J, outcome restates original claims/undertakes
joint project; K, underlying issues resurface/are addressed (e.g., relationships return to status quo/are trans-
formed); L, ceasefire/demobilization/disarmament/demilitarization; M, no change in government structure/
transitional government (e.g., elections, constitutional reforms).
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findings do not confront the possibility of a spurious relationship between process and
outcome. That issue is addressed with partial correlations.
Correlations between process and outcome remain high when each context variable is
controlled: 0.79 (controlling for regime type); 0.75 (for geographic proximity); 0.80 (for
alliances); and 0.81 (for regional stability). Thus, the outcomes obtained in this set of
cases are strongly associated with the type of process used. This result applies as well to
disputing parties in close proximity. If these parties can be encouraged to engage in a
problem-solving process, their talks are likely to conclude with more comprehensive
agreements. These results do not support hypotheses 3a–d.
Structured Focused Comparisons
The correlation analyses reported in the previous section do not establish a causal
relationship between process and outcome, as suggested by hypothesis 1b. A different
kind of analysis is needed to assess the direction of the relationship between these
variables. As described in the section ‘‘The Approach,’’ structured focused comparisons
were used to compare processes and outcomes in sets of both matched and mismatched
cases. As shown in Table 1, the matched cases are Georgia/South Ossetia and Nagorno-
Karabakh. As noted above, these cases are similar on most of categories used for
comparison: geographic location, population size, distribution of ethnic groups (one
dominant group), distribution of religions (one dominant religion), official language,
literacy, date of independence, type of government, and distribution of labor force. The
mismatched cases are Mozambique and Ecuador/Peru. These cases are dissimilar on
most of the nine categories used for comparison. The procedure consisted of comparing
each pair of cases on the aggregated process and outcome scores.
With regard to the matched cases, the aggregated process scores were 3.5 (Georgia/
South Ossetia) and 1.5 (Nagorno-Karabakh). The aggregated outcomes were 3.5 and
1.2, respectively. The problem-solving process used by negotiators to settle the Georgia/
South Ossetia conflict resulted in comprehensive outcomes. The distributive process
used in the cease fire negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan resulted in a much
less comprehensive agreement. The similarity of these cases on a variety of other
variables bolsters the inference that outcomes are caused by the approach taken to
negotiate the parties’ differences.
Table 5
Correlations Among Context Variables
AGOUT
Regime
type
Geographic
proximity Alliances
Regional
stability
AGPRO .81 ).34 ).45 .06 .03
AGOUT ).22 ).51 .05 .23
Regime type .41 .14 .32
Geographic proximity .13 .48
Alliances .43
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On the mismatched cases, the process scores were 2.6 (Mozambique) and 2.8
(Ecuador/Peru). The outcomes were identical, 3.5 for each case. In both cases, a process
that was more like problem solving than distributive led to a comprehensive outcome.
This finding of very similar processes and identical outcomes for cases that differ on a
variety of other variables further reinforces the likelihood of a causal relationship
between process and outcome, as posited by hypothesis 1b. Indeed, this finding for
mismatched cases provides evidence for a robust relationship. A next step is to probe
the negotiating process in more detail with process-tracing techniques.
Process Tracing
The aggregate measures described do not capture the way the negotiation process
unfolds through time. These are summary measures of problem-solving and distributive
codes across the phases of negotiation. It is necessary also to know whether these behav-
iors increased or decreased from earlier to later phases. This is assessed by comparing
the aggregated process measure for the first and last third of the negotiation conducted
in each of the four cases. The comparisons are made for the number of codes assigned
in each of the four categories, including distributive (1), mixed/distributive (2), mixed/
problem-solving (3), and problem-solving (4) behaviors. The results are reported for
each case in Table 6.
Considerably more problem-solving behaviors were coded during the last third of the
talks than during the earlier phase of the negotiations about the conflict in Mozambique
(32 vs. 3 problem-solving codes). There were fewer mixed and distributive codes during
the later phases. Similarly, for the Ecuador/Peru and Georgia/South Ossetia cases, more
problem-solving (and fewer distributive) codes were assigned during the last than first
third of the negotiation. The Nagorno-Karabakh case presents a different picture.
Although there is a trend toward more problem-solving behaviors from the first to the
last phase, the bulk of the codes occur in the distributive categories: 89% in the first
and 65% in the third phase. Further, no category four problem-solving behaviors were
recorded in either the early or late phases. These data show clear trends toward
increased problem-solving behavior for the three cases that concluded with comprehen-
sive outcomes. They also show less distributive behavior from the beginning to the end
Table 6
Early and Late Processes by Coding Categories and Cases
Category
Mozambique Peru/Ecuador
Georgia/South
Ossetia
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Last
third
First
third
Last
third
First
third
Last
third
First
third
Last
third
First
third
Problem solving (4) 32 3 16 1 29 0 0 0
Mixed/problem solving (3) 75 84 28 16 15 4 39 12
Mixed/distributive (2) 44 50 15 15 9 18 47 49
Distributive (1) 4 13 9 9 1 3 24 48
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of the Nagorno-Karabakh talks, a case that resulted in a less comprehensive outcome.
The shift from distributive to problem-solving was not sufficient to produce a compre-
hensive agreement. Overall, the process tracings buttress support for the causal relation-
ship between negotiating processes and outcomes suggested by hypothesis 1b.
Plausibility Probe
The second set of hypotheses suggests that the relationship between process and outcome
can be explained by trust. These hypotheses are addressed with a time-series analysis or
plausibility probe described in ‘‘The Approach’’ section. The analysis is performed in steps.
First, we advanced a concept—trust—that is hypothesized to explain the relationship
between process and outcome. Second, we developed a scale designed to measure the
concept. Third, events were coded for each case on the scale. And fourth, the events were
arranged in a time series to discern patterns in the way the measure varies through the
course of the negotiation process. This probe generates a plausible explanation for why
different processes lead to different outcomes.
Hypothesis 2a suggests that trust co-varies with process: trust encourages problem-solv-
ing behavior, which, in turn, enhances trust between the parties. The mutually reinforcing
effects of trust and problem solving increase the chances for a more comprehensive
agreement. The scale, drawn from Lewicki and Stevenson (1997) and shown above in the
section on ‘‘Cases,’’ captures the idea of levels of trust. Starting with no trust, the scale pro-
gresses from less (calculus-based) to more (knowledge and identity-based) trust. The
coded levels are plotted against time for each of the four cases used in the focused-compar-
ison analysis. A different number of events were coded for each case: 98 codes for Mozam-
bique, 40 for Peru/Ecuador, 15 for Georgia/South Ossetia, and 53 for Nagorno-Karabakh.
The results are shown in Figure 1a–d.
The patterns displayed in the figures demonstrate that trust is an important variable.
For three of the four cases, low levels of trust are evident at the beginning, increasing
through the course of the negotiations, and concluding at relatively high levels.
Evidently, the parties moved back and forth between higher and lower levels but gravi-
tated toward identity-based trust (level 4) at the end. It is as though they were tentative
in their expression of trust or hesitant to be fully trusting until later in the talks. The
key here is that they came around before settling on an agreement. Not so for the case
of Nagorno-Karabakh. Although these negotiating delegations got off to a good start,
showing knowledge-based trust in early time periods, they did not sustain this optimis-
tic appraisal. At the end, they evinced a calculus-based trust (level 2). This low level of
trust is coincident with the large number of distributive behaviors shown by these
negotiators.
These results indicate that increased (decreased) levels of trust co-vary with more
(less) comprehensive outcomes. This finding supports hypothesis 2a, which suggests
mutually reinforcing effects of trust and problem-solving behaviors: Higher levels of
trust were obtained for cases with more comprehensive outcomes. Less clear is the
direction of the relationship between trust and process: Does trust (problem-solving)
drive problem solving (trust)? This leader-lagger pattern remains to be evaluated. Thus,
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a verdict on hypothesis 2b awaits the results of research that examines the time lag
between these variables. These and other issues are discussed in the section to follow.
Discussion
The literature reviewed in the opening section of this article suggests that relationships
between negotiating processes and outcomes should not be taken for granted. Results
obtained from earlier studies are mixed, with some calling attention to the role played
by external factors as influences on outcomes. These then became contending explana-
tions that correspond generally to the different perspectives of CR and IR theorists: Do
outcomes result primarily from the way the process unfolds (CR) or are they influenced
more strongly by the broader context surrounding the negotiation (IR)? Our results are
clear. Outcomes correlate with process, not with context, as these variables were defined
in the analysis. Further analyses lend support to a causal relationship between process
and outcome. Thus, hypotheses 1a and 1b are supported; hypotheses 3a–d are not
supported. Confidence in these findings is bolstered by the robust sampling of cases
analyzed, the step-by-step probes of causation and explanation, and the multiple
indicators of both processes and outcomes. Thus, the CR perspective garners more
support from these findings than the IR perspective.
The plausibility probe highlights the role played by trust in these talks. This demonstra-
tion shows that trust co-varies with process as specified by hypothesis 2a. An evaluation
of causal influence entails separating trust from negotiating behavior. Although this is
difficult to do with case studies, it is not beyond the realm of possibility. For example, cases
can be selected for the four combinations of high/low trust and high/low problem-solving
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Figure 1. (a) Trust Development—Ecuador/Peru. (b) Trust Development—Georgia/South Ossetia. (c) Trust
Development—Mozambique. (d) Trust Development—Nagorno-Karabakh.
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behavior. Using outcome as the dependent variable, this focused comparison would isolate
the relative effects of the two independent variables. The other issue concerning trust,
raised in the introduction, is about complex interactions. Levels of trust may be influenced
by such contextual variables as alliances or regional stability. These levels may then
encourage or discourage cooperative behaviors leading to more or less comprehensive
outcomes. This suggests a path model where contextual factors set in motion processes
that lead to certain outcomes. It can be investigated with such tools as structural equation
modeling (Byrne, 2001).
The results of this study are important both for theory and practice. With regard to
theory, the findings support those CR frameworks that emphasize the importance of
process. Particularly notable are the early frameworks of Sawyer and Guetzkow (1965)
and Walton and McKersie (1965). The former highlighted a causal relationship between
process and outcome. The latter offered the distinction between distributive and integra-
tive (problem-solving) models of negotiation. These conceptual contributions are linked
by our findings. Distributive processes led to less comprehensive outcomes. Integrative
(problem-solving) processes produced more comprehensive outcomes. The findings also
address the long-standing debate between the macro-level theorists of IR and the pro-
cess-oriented researchers in the field of CR. The former tend to black-box the negotia-
tion process in favor of explanations that rely on policy or systemic variables (examples
are found in the work of Simmons, 2002; Walter, 2002; and Werner, 1999). The latter
focuses on the interactions and conversations held among the negotiators themselves
(see also Donohue & Hoobler, 2002, and Donohue, 2003, for further empirical examples
of interaction analysis).
Although the results lend support to the process-oriented approach, it is conceivable
that other contextual variables may prove to be stronger influences on outcomes than
those included in our analyses. While the variables chosen for analysis in this study were
derived from earlier empirical work, they do not exhaust the list of potentially relevant
contextual factors. For example, such aspects of the conflict environment as intervention
by regional neighbors, border permeability, or disposable natural resources may come
into play. These variables have been shown to influence the implementation of peace
agreements (Downs & Stedman, 2002). Further, as noted earlier, process and context
may interact. Impacts of context on process are likely when conflicts between other
nations escalate during the negotiations, when changes occur in related (or linked)
negotiations, or when policy changes within either or both parties’ governments
occur (see Druckman et al., 2009, for an experimental example of impacts from the
social climate). These relationships remain to be investigated.
With regard to practice, the findings can be used to support various third-party
initiatives ranging from traditional mediation within the context of formal talks (referred
to as Track I) to unofficial activities (referred to as Track II) often initiated by nongovern-
mental organizations. Each type of initiative is based on the assumption that help with the
process will produce more satisfactory outcomes. A particularly strong case has been made
for the value of problem-solving workshops in IR. By creating an atmosphere conducive
to problem-solving discussions, these practitioners claim that members of disputing
groups will develop a more complex, less stereotyped view of each other. This, in turn, is
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presumed to lead to more amiable relationships between their groups (Rouhana, 2000). By
showing that problem-solving processes produce better outcomes, our findings bolster
these claims. They reinforce the value of interventions—whether Track I or II—intended
to encourage problem-solving processes or to discourage distributive approaches to
the resolution of conflict. They also offer the optimistic appraisal that opportunities for
change are provided by tampering with a more malleable process than with a less malleable
context surrounding negotiation.
Another important contribution of this study is to methodology. A multi-method
approach to investigation is rare in case studies of negotiation and peace processes. This is
not surprising given the demands on data collection and analysis. Both a large number of
cases for statistical analysis and sufficient documentation of details for qualitative inquiry
are needed. These challenges were met in this study. A sufficiently large data set was
complemented by rich descriptions of processes in the cases selected for the microscopic
probes.
Further, the logical progression of analyses performed may be a model for future
research. It is an inductive progression guided by hypotheses. The next step depends on
findings obtained from the previous analysis. Nonspurious association (A) between
variables must be demonstrated before causality (C) can be assessed. Evidence for cau-
sality precedes the search for a plausible explanation (E). This sequence, referred to by
the acronym ACE, corresponds to the way that laboratory experiments are conducted. It
captures the control, time-lagged, and intervening variable features of experimental
design with retrospective case-based material. The control feature is addressed with
partial correlations; an analog to the time-lagged feature is structured focused compari-
sons, and the intervening variable search is set in motion with a plausibility probe. The
result is a real-world demonstration of negotiation processes causing outcomes through
the development of trust.
A number of ideas are suggested for further research. These include exploring the
effects of other variables and sampling other types of cases, including those assisted by
third parties. As noted above, the four contextual variables chosen for analysis in this
study do not exhaust the domain. Although the plausibility probe highlights trust
development as an explanation for the causal relationship between process and outcome,
the analysis did not compare trust with other possible explanations. Other hypothesized
mechanisms include the development of affiliative perceptions, trends toward symmetry
in perceived power, and an increased (decreased) number of forward (backward)-look-
ing statements through the course of the talks. However, these variables have been
shown to correlate with trust (Donohue & Druckman, 2009). Thus, it will be necessary
to evaluate their independent effects either by using statistical controls or by conducting
experiments.
Of course the results are based on the particular sampling of cases used for analysis.
The cases share the features of being settled violent conflicts, negotiations conducted
primarily between parties representing different countries, and having adequate
documentation for coding. Other kinds of negotiated conflicts can be sampled. Examples
include nonviolent territorial disputes, extending previous treaties such as those over base
rights, and arms control or nonproliferation talks. Considerable documentation is also
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available for a variety of bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral trade talks (such as NAFTA),
multilateral regime negotiations (such as those intended to establish cooperative relations
among regional neighbors), and conference diplomacy in the areas of environmental
regulation (such as the Rio and Kyoto agreements) and security (such as the United
Nations conference on disarmament). Extending the sampling further, we could code
process and context variables for cases of assisted, third-party negotiations such as those
included in the Bercovitch and Trappl (2006) data set. The question of interest is
whether the causal relationship between negotiation processes and outcomes, obtained in
this study with a broad sampling of violent conflicts, is found also with other types of
negotiated conflicts. This question, along with the others mentioned above, provides an
interesting agenda for further research.
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Appendix
Cases, Parties, and Indices
Title of case study Parties
Scores
Process Outcome
‘‘The Geneva Accords on Afghanistan:
A Case Study of the United Nations
as a Third Party Mediator’’ (1988)
Afghanistan
Soviet Union
2.11 1.33
‘‘A Process Analysis of the 1971
Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin’’
Federal Republic of Germany
France
German Democratic Republic
Great Britain
Soviet Union
United States
2.22 2.00
‘‘The Vatican Mediation of the Beagle
Channel Dispute: Crisis Intervention
and Forum Building’’ (1984)
Argentina
Chile
2.50 2.75
‘‘From Lisbon to Dayton: International
Mediation and the Bosnia Crisis’’ (1995)
Bosnia
Croatia
Serbia
1.53 1.77
‘‘Settlement for Cambodia:
The Khmer Rouge Dilemma’’ (1990)
Democratic Kampuchea
Khmer Rouge
China
Vietnam
2.29 3.13
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(Continued)
Title of case study Parties
Scores
Process Outcome
‘‘The Camp David Accords: A Case of
International Bargaining’’ (1978)
Egypt
Israel
2.31 2.00
‘‘Outwitting a Superpower: Iranian-Soviet
Negotiations, 1945’’
Iran
Soviet Union
2.38 1.60
‘‘Israel’s Armistice Agreements: Analysis
of Negotiation Processes Leading up to
and Concluding in Armistice Accords
with Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and
Transjordan in 1949’’
Egypt
Israel
Jordan
Lebanon
Syria
2.15 1.43
‘‘Negotiation on the Periphery: The
Islands Dispute Between Japan and
Russia’’ (1993)
Japan
Russia
2.63 2.60
‘‘Kilometer 101: Oasis or Mirage? An
Analysis of Third-Party Self-Interest in
International Mediation’’ (1973)
Egypt
Israel
1.04 1.40
‘‘The Madrid Conference: Baker’s
Enticing Diplomacy’’ (1996)
Egypt
Israel
Jordan
Palestine
Saudi Arabia
Syria
1.52 1.60
‘‘One Step Towards Peace: The ‘Final
Peace Agreement’ in Mindanao’’ (1996)
Moro National Liberation Front
Republic of the Philippines
2.90 2.88
‘‘Striking a Balance: The Northern Ireland
Peace Process’’ (1998)
Democratic Unions Party
Great Britain
Irish Republican Army
Sinn Fe´in
Ulster Unionist Party
United Kingdom Unionist Party
2.48 2.79
‘‘The Oslo Channel’’ Israel
Palestine Liberation Organization
2.54 2.52
‘‘The Panama Canal Negotiations’’ (1978) Panama
United States
1.81 2.20
‘‘The Partition of Poland’’ (1772) Austria
Poland
Prussia
Russia
2.46 2.00
‘‘Paying the Price: The Sierra
Leone Peace Process’’ (1996)
National Provincial Ruling Council (NPRC)
Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
2.40 2.00
‘‘The 1972 Simla Agreement:
An Asymmetrical Negotiation’’
India
Pakistan
2.01 1.63
‘‘Report on Peacemaking Initiative
in Somaliland’’ (1997)
Garhajis
Republic of Somaliland
3.21 2.80
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(Continued)
Title of case study Parties
Scores
Process Outcome
‘‘South Africa: The Negotiated
Transition from Apartheid
to Nonracial Democracy’’ (1994)
African National Congress
Congress of South African Trade Unions
South Africa
United Democratic Front
2.89 3.30
‘‘The Tamil-Sinhalese Ethnic Conflict
in Sri Lanka: A Case
Study in Efforts to Negotiate A
Settlement, 1983–1988’’
India
Sinhalese people
Tamil people
Sri Lanka
1.65 1.64
‘‘The Suez Crisis, 1956’’ Egypt
Israel
1.70 1.20
‘‘Politics of Compromise: the
Tajikistan Peace Process’’ (1994)
Tajikistan
United Tajik Opposition
2.94 3.06
‘‘The American Use of Force in Vietnam:
An Unconventional Approach to
Negotiation’’ (1973)
North Vietnam
U.S.
1.09 1.00
Zarko Affair (1970)
‘‘Releasing the Hostages at
Revolutionary Airstrip: The Failure of
Negotiation by Design’’
Israel
Jordan
Germany
Palestine
Switzerland
1.51 1.40
‘‘The May 1983 Agreement over
Lebanon’’
Israel
Lebanon
Palestine Liberation Organization
1.80 1.40
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